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Abstract
In this article, we investigate economic and political developments in Turkey’s
construction sector over the last decade and consider their implications.
We find that during the first term of the government of the Justice and
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), thanks to adminis-
trative and economic incentives, both private and public construction rose
considerably. Despite the construction sector’s contribution to growth, there is
also evidence of a transfer from the industrial sector toward the construction
sector, which led to significant decline in the trend growth of the industrial
sector in the era prior to 2006. Such evidence disappears in the post-crisis
period, when the growth of private construction slows. However, over-
centralization, clientelism, an absence of transparency, and limitations on
citizen participation in urban planning remain as problems that need to be
addressed through urban reform.
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Introduction
Turkey has been going through a profound urban renewal process over the past
decade, one based on an urban policy where public and private land have been
aggressively developed with major government support. In the view of some,
property development is one of the pillars of Turkey’s economic growth, and
therefore deserves the support it receives. In contrast, certain critiques suggest
that Turkey’s construction sector has developed too rapidly and at the expense
of other important sectors, such as the industrial sector. In addition, the
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centralized and clientelistic mechanisms that have dominated this urban
renewal process have had adverse effects on state-society relations and have
strained the social fabric. Despite profound public interest in the topic,
empirical studies investigating this subject remain limited. This article aims to
make a contribution in this regard by analyzing the government’s role in the rise
of the construction sector, the extent of growth in this sector, and the economic
and political consequences of these developments.
We show that the construction sector developed rather rapidly in the period
before 2006, but then adopted a slower growth trend in the post-crisis era.
The rise of the construction sector was supported by legal reforms that pro-
moted public and private property development by lifting institutional
restrictions and centralizing property development. These changes in the law
enabled the government administration to develop public land and to provide
cheap land to favored partners in the private sector, which in turn generated
excessive rents.
The rapid rise of a state-led construction sector had important political and
economic consequences vis-à-vis industrial development, the distribution of land
rents, relationships between actors in the state and private sectors, and citizens’
rights as regards their urban environment. Our findings suggest that there was a
transfer from the industrial sector to the construction sector in the period
before 2006, which led to significant decline in the trend growth of the industrial
sector.We believe that these results are related to the excessive rent generated in
the construction sector, to opaqueness and favoritism in regards to distribution,
and to limitations put on fair competition within the sector. These factors
promoted clientelism and eroded ordinary citizens’ influence on urban policy
decisions.
In the post-crisis era, the construction sector has slowed, which has
weakened the validity of the widespread perception of there being an ever-rising
share in the construction sector. The basic statistics provided in this paper
reflect that the pre-crisis trend cannot be generalized in such a way as to
accurately depict the subsequent developments that occurred in this sector
during the second half of the decade. Our analysis highlights how, following a
rapid increase in the years leading up to the 2007 global crisis, the share of the
construction sector returned quickly to its pre-crisis levels, no longer con-
tributing to the slowdown in the industrial sector during the post-crisis era.
Nevertheless, a closer look at the data reveals certain characteristics of this
sector that are effectively hidden in the aggregate numbers. When we decom-
pose total construction into its private and public components, we observe that,
while private construction has slowed, public construction has continued to
grow rapidly—along with the concerns that inevitably have arisen due to the
excessive centralization and clientelism in the sector. This fact indicates the
























necessity of an urgent reform in urban policy, one that would institute
decentralization and transparency in urban development.
The AKP government, economic growth, and urban policy
The rise of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,
AKP) in 2002 and its continued electoral success in subsequent years was well
received in neoliberal circles. This was mainly the result of the government’s
economic policies—which emphasized production, privatization, and other
business-oriented policies—as well as its ability to maintain an above-average
growth rate, particularly in its early years (Figure 1).
Privatization of public land and promotion of public and private property
development played an important role in the growth strategy of the
AKP government. Despite its overall neoliberal orientation, the government
adopted a highly active role in the development of the construction sector,
providing incentives both economic and political. The most significant
economic incentive included the cheap land that the government provided for
the purposes of property development.1 Most large-scale developments took
place through public-private partnerships, in which the state provided land
while the private sector carried out the construction projects. In other cases, the
state took an even more active role and carried out developments itself, using
public land.










02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat) and authors’ calculations
1 See Ozan Karaman, “Urban Neoliberalismwith Islamic Characteristics,” Urban Studies 50, no. 16 (2013):
3412–3427 and Tuna Kuyucu and Özlem Ünsal, “Urban Transformation as State-led Property Transfer:

























Changes in the legal framework
The government’s contribution to urban renewal was not limited to the
provision of land, but also included reforms that shaped the pace of urban
development. The changes and amendments made to the relevant laws over the
past decade have dramatically centralized urban planning and lifted restrictions
in urban development.2 Perhaps the most important reform in this respect
concerns the changes made to the Housing Development Administration Law
(Toplu Konut Kanunu; henceforth HDAL, no. 2985).3 The numerous
amendments made to the HDAL between 2003 and 2013 transformed the
rather idle state institution of the Housing Development Administration
(Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı, TOKİ; henceforth HDA) into a major actor
in property development, one which enjoys extensive powers, including pub-
licizing private land, privatizing public land (independently from the Public
Procurement Authority [Kamu İhale Kurumu]; henceforth PPA), developing
for-profit real estate projects (independently from government ministries and
municipalities), and forming partnerships with private developers. Today, the
HDA is exclusively and directly accountable to the PrimeMinistry, maintains a
private budget independent from the treasury, enjoys exemptions from
taxation, and can avoid the fiscal auditing of the Turkish Court of Accounts
(T.C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı), the main regulatory institution against corruption.
Atiyas notes that, although the HDA’s exemptions were originally limited to
public housing projects, in 2011 these were extended so as to cover all of its
construction activities.4
Another important legal change took place in the Public Procurement Law
(Kamu İhale Kanunu; henceforth PPL, no. 4734), which was amended
extensively between 2002 and 2014.5 The amendments limited the powers of
the PPA to regulate the sale of public land and other construction-based
government procurements. Transparency in regards to such procurements is
critical in ensuring competitiveness in the property development sector and in
fighting corruption. However, the amendments made to the PPL granted
60 institutions, including the HDA, exemptions from the PPL and relaxed
procurement regulations. These reforms may well have expedited procurement
processes, but at the same time they severely limited the regulatory power of
the PPA and hindered the transparency of the procurements.
2 See Daron Acemoğlu and Murat Üçer, “The Ups and Downs of Turkish Growth, 2002–2015: Political
Dynamics, the European Union and the Institutional Slide,” NBER Working Paper No: 21608, 2015.
3 For the amendments to the HDAL, see http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2985.pdf.
4 İzak Atiyas, “Economic Institutions and Institutional Change in Turkey during the Neoliberal Era,”
New Perspectives on Turkey 14 (2012): 45–69.
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Other important legal interventions promoting property development
include the amendments made to the Law on Land Development Planning and
Control (İmar Kanunu; henceforth LLDPC, no. 3194), the Law on
Metropolitan Municipalities (Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kanunu; hencforth LMM,
no. 5216), the Law on the Transformation of Areas under Disaster Risk
(Afet Riski Altındaki Alanların Dönüştürülmesi Hakkında Kanun; henceforth
LTADR, no. 6306), and the Land Registry and Cadastral Law (Tapu Kanunu
ve Kadastro Kanunu; henceforth LRCL, no. 6302), among others. The
amendments made to the LLDPC relaxed the necessary procedures for
obtaining building permits and limited the enforcement of the administrative
court’s decisions meant to stop unlawful construction developments.6 The
LMM centralized urban planning by granting metropolitan municipalities
increased rights to develop city plans and by limiting the power of local
administrations, thereby hindering residents’ access to the urban planning
decisions that impact their surroundings.7 The LTADR allowed public actors,
such as the HDA and its private sector allies, to intervene in and transform
areas that they designate as being under risk of disaster, without having to
receive consent from the residents.8 Finally, the LRCL provided foreign
nationals (with exceptions including Cuban, North Korean, Syrian, and
Armenian nationals) with the right to purchase private property in Turkey.9
These legal amendments allowed the state not only to promote property
development, but also to become a key actor in the construction sector. The
HDA records suggest that the number of housing units developed through
HDA projects has risen considerably over the past decade, from 43,145
between 1984 and 2003 to 590,483 between 2004 and 2014.10 According to
statistics from the Association of Real Estate and Real Estate Investment
Companies (Gayrimenkul ve Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı Derneği,
GYODER), as cited by Törüner in 2008, the HDA’s market share increased
from 1.1 percent in 2003 to 18.6 percent in 2007.11 Similarly, 2013 statistics
from the Organization of Housing Developers and Investors (Konut Geliştir-
icileri ve Yatırımcıları Derneği, KONUTDER) suggest that the HDA is the
6 For the amendments to the LLDPC, see http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.3194.pdf.
7 For the amendments to the LLM, see http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.5216.pdf.
8 For the amendments to the LTADR, see http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.6306.pdf.




10 For a list of auctions held by the HDA (TOKİ) see http://www.toki.gov.tr/illere-gore-projeler.



























number one actor in the housing sector, having developed 10 percent of all
housing units developed between 2002 and 2012.
While the HDA records reveal the massive rise of the HDA as a developer
and/or partner in the construction sector, private sector counterparts have also
enjoyed the new legal environment promoting property development. Cheap
land obtained through connections to the government and fewer institutional
restrictions on property development have reduced economic and bureaucratic
costs for these entrepreneurs and promoted new construction. Figure 2
demonstrates the dramatic rise in building permits distributed over the
past decade, which occurred thanks to changes to the laws that lifted restric-
tions on property development. Figure 3 compares the profits earned in
various sectors of the economy between 2005 and 2013 and demonstrates the
rise in the profitability of the construction sector, which surpassed other
sectors.12
Overall, the government’s emphasis on urban development, its active role in
the construction sector, and changes made in the legal framework had impor-
tant consequences. The following sections of the article focus on the economic
consequences of this urban policy and analyze the role that the construction
sector has played in Turkey’s economic growth.
The rise of the construction sector
In order to analyze the development of the construction sector and situate its
role within the broader economic context of Turkey, in Figure 4 we plot the
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12 It is advisable to take the given profit numbers with a grain of salt, because the rent generated in the
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four components of Turkey’s GDP according to the production approach,
using quarterly data for the period from 1998.q1 through 2015.q1. Table 1
provides the annual growth rates of these components.
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Several observations are immediately noticeable from Figure 4 and Table 1:
(i) the construction sector was indeed the most rapidly growing sector in the
period before the financial crisis (Table 1, row 1), but the post-crisis trend
(row 3, column 3) seems to be slower than the pre-crisis trend (row 1,
column 3); (ii) there has been a slowdown in the trend growth of the industrial
sector in the post-crisis period (row 3, column 4), which closely follows
the general trend in the GDP; (iii) there was also a slight slowdown in the
services sector after 2007 (column 5); and (iv) the agricultural sector has been
the only sector to accelerate its trend growth in the period after the 2007–2008
financial crisis.
Figure 5 illustrates the shares of these sub-components as a fraction of the
GDP, while Table 2 provides average quarterly shares. The red line shows the
Hodrick-Prescott time trend. From 2001 onwards, the share of the construc-
tion sector increased, reaching its peak in 2007, as seen in Figure 5. However,
after the crisis, its share dropped back down to slightly below 6 percent, which
is approximately the average for the whole sample, as seen in Table 2
(column 2). Despite the acceleration in the growth rate of the agricultural
sector in recent years, we may also note that its share in the GDP followed a
decreasing trend over time (Table 2, column 1). Turning to the lower panels,
the share of industry had an increasing trend starting roughly in 2002 and
continuing until the 2007–2008 crisis, but the trend growth then slows in the
post-crisis period. The last panel shows that the share of the service sector has
had an increasing trend throughout the sample period.
In addition to the production approach, another method of decomposing the
GDP is the expenditure approach.With this approach, construction spending is
shown as part of the investment category, which is further broken down into
public and private investment. Figure 6 illustrates the share of construction
measured according to the expenditure approach. The left panel shows the share
of construction expenditure undertaken by the public sector, while the middle
panel shows the share of construction expenditure undertaken by the private
sector. The panel on the right then shows the sum of these two sub-components
as a fraction of the GDP, which is comparable to the upper right panel
Table 1. Average Annual Growth Rates
I. GDP II. Agriculture III. Construction IV. Industry V. Services
1. 1998–2006 4.36 1.17 6.16 4.45 4.94
2. 2007–2010 2.82 0.73 –0.92 3.27 4.20
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in Figure 5.13 Since 2004, the share of the public sector construction expenditure
has had an increasing trend. Even though the share of private construction











































































































Real GDP using 1998 prices (million TL). Seasonally adjusted data using Census X-13 technique.
Source: Turkstat and authors’ calculations
Table 2. Average Quarterly Shares
Agriculture/GDP Construction/GDP Industry/GDP Services/GDP
1. 1998–2006 10.85 5.77 26.02 54.71
2. 2007–2010 9.50 5.61 26.68 57.71
3. 2011–2015 9.13 5.84 26.92 58.75
13 The construction-to-GDP ratio as measured by the expenditure approach (Figure 6) is higher than the
corresponding ratio as measured by the production approach (Figure 4), although they follow
identical trends. With the production approach, each sector’s contribution to the GDP is computed
using the total value added of that sector. Therefore, the series used in Figure 4 measures the total
output produced by the construction sector, excluding the value of the inputs used in production.
The latter are accounted for by other sectors of the economy that provide inputs for the construction
sector, such as the industrial sector. The series used in Figure 6, on the other hand, measures the total
spending on goods produced by the construction sector, which is the total value of final goods, and

























expenditure declines in the post-crisis period, the share of public construction
expenditure continues to increase. In the aggregate, however, the overall decline
in private construction offsets the rise in public construction, thus keeping the
share of total construction in the GDP at a stable level.
Finally, a comparative perspective suggests that the growth of the construc-
tion sector in Turkey has paralleled its counterparts elsewhere. Figure 7 com-
pares the share of the construction sector in Turkey with several other emerging
market economies, as well as with those eurozone countries that experienced a
construction boom. The charts plot the share of the construction sector as a
fraction of the GDP. The top panel compares the construction ratio in Turkey
with the so-called “BRICS” economies, which are the major emerging market
economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. We observe that,
while the share of the construction sector is highest for India (hovering around
7 percent) and lowest for South Africa (hovering around 3 percent), Turkey
remains inside this corridor for the entire period from 1990 to 2012. The middle
panel provides a further comparison with other emerging market economies,
such as Indonesia, Mexico, and South Korea. Here, we observe that the share of
the construction sector in Turkey is consistently below these countries as well.
The lower panel compares the share of Turkey’s construction sector with those
eurozone countries whose names were associated with real estate bubbles during
the recent financial crisis; namely, Spain, Iceland, and Ireland. Here, we observe
that the construction ratios in these troubled economies were more than twice as
large as the share of the construction sector in Turkey.
Overall, Figure 7 suggests that, even though the construction sector grew
rapidly before 2006, its share has in fact been comparable to other emerging
market economies, and that it has never reached the levels observed in those
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Construction/GDP
Real GDP using 1998 prices (million TL).
Seasonally adjusted data using Census X-13 technique.
Source: Turkstat and authors’ calculations.
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countries that experienced real estate bubbles. Although the growth in the con-
struction sector is not at an extreme level, this fact does not preempt the problems
associated with the state’s involvement in the construction sector, with the
opaqueness of the law, and with the generation of excessive rent, all of which may
generate wrong incentives for entrepreneurs to switch into construction from
more productive sectors. In the next section, we investigate this question formally.
The effects of construction on economic growth
When the AKP came to power in 2002, Turkey’s story of rapid growth driven
by the industrial sector continued, but now with an additional emphasis on the
promotion of property development. However, the AKP’s urban policy created
controversy. While some groups considered the government’s urban renewal
strategy to be the real engine of Turkey’s economic growth, others argued that it
may have had adverse effects on the economy, particularly due to excessive state
involvement and the limits placed on transparency and institutional checks.
Soon after the AKP’s second term in 2007, the global financial crisis struck.
While Turkey’s GDP had a quick rebound after the recession in 2008, the
pre-crisis trend has not yet been matched again (Figure 8).
The slowing trend in the GDP was largely due to the slowdown in the
industrial sector, which was argued, by some critics, to have been a consequence
of the expansion in the construction sector.14 A shift from the industrial sector
to the construction sector can partly explain the slowdown in economic growth,
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Source: Turkstat
14 See, for instance, Şevket Pamuk, “2007 Sonrası Partiye Yakın Zengin Bir Zümre Yaratmak En Büyük
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owing to the lower productivity of the construction sector as compared to the
industrial sector. Furthermore, unlike the industrial sector, which contributes
to production both directly and indirectly by producing the means to
produce other products, the construction sector’s contribution to total output
is limited to the final good produced.15 Hence, a transfer from the industrial
sector to the construction sector was and is bound to lead to a slowdown in
GDP growth.
Figure 9 takes a closer look at the sub-components of the industrial sector—
namely, manufacturing, public utilities (including electricity production and
distribution as well as water purification and sewage systems), and mining—as
a share of GDP. One can note that the overall trend of the industrial sector is
driven by manufacturing, which is its largest component. Unfortunately, a finer
breakdown within the manufacturing sector is not available, though it would
allow us to see whether or not the production of intermediate goods for the
construction sector has increased. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that
infrastructure spending, as captured in the public utilities category, follows the
increase in the construction sector with a lag. Two years after the construction
sector reached its peak during 2006–2007, the public utilities sector reached its
peak during 2008–2009.
It has been argued that excessive rents are available in the construction
sector for whoever can secure inroads to the state bureacucracy and obtain
favorable government contracts and/or building permits (cf. Figure 1), which
attracts industrialists to the construction sector to seek and find such rents.
While government officials have noted that growth in the construction sector










































































Source: Turkstat and authors’ calculations.
com.tr/yazarlar/ezgi_basaran/2007_sonrasi_partiye_yakin_zengin_bir_zumre_yaratmak_en_buyuk_
ekonomik_hedef_oldu-1242057; Ali Babacan, “İnşaatta Ölçüsüz Rantlar Var,” Yeni Şafak,
September 16, 2014, http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/ekonomi/babacan-insaatta-olcusuz-rant-var-
685512; “İnşaattaki Artış Diğer Sanayileri Engelliyor,” March 26, 2015, http://www.emlakguncel.com/
haber/insaattaki-artis-diger-sanayileri-engelliyor; and Mahfi Eğilmez, “İnşaata Dayalı Büyüme
Modelinin Sonu,” August 10, 2015, http://www.mahfiegilmez.com/2015/08/insaat-onderliginde-
buyume-modelinin.html.

























has been following normal trends, it has also been admitted that regulatory
changes did indeed cause excessive rents. Former Deputy Prime Minister
Ali Babacan expressed his concerns about these issues, noting that “there is
excessive rent in the construction sector, which reduces interest in the
industrial sector,” and that the priority would be to reintroduce transparency
and thereby avoid rent-based shifts in the industrial sector toward
construction.16
In this section, we will analyze these claims formally and investigate
whether the slowdown in GDP growth is indeed connected to the relationship
between the construction sector and the industrial sector. Simple growth
charts give no information about causal relationships or any spillover
that may exist among different sectors. Therefore, further analysis is necessary
in order to test the claim that the slowdown in industrial growth could
be at least partially attributed to the excessive rent generated in the
construction sector. With this purpose in mind, we will first document the
declining trend in the industrial sector. Figure 5, as mentioned above, had
plotted the Hodrick-Prescott time trend of the industrial sector’s share in
the GDP, highlighting the slowdown in this trend. Figure 10, on the other
hand, illustrates the growth rate of this trend in order to better illustrate the
slowdown.
The average growth rate in the trend of the industry-to-GDP ratio
declines from 0.15 in the 2003–2006 period to 0.08 during the post-2006
period, where the difference is statistically significant (not shown).17 The
question, then, is whether or not the construction sector is at least
partly responsible for this decline. If the popular claims are true, then the
excessive rents in construction projects may have caused shifts from
the industrial sector to the construction sector. In such a case, the decline
in the share of industry could be at least partially explained by transfers from
the industrial sector to the construction sector, as an attempt to exploit
such rents.




t Þ= α + β1 Industryt1 + β2 ConstructionPrivatet1
+ β3 Construction
Public
t1 + β4 Agriculturet1 + β5 Servicest1 + ϵt ð1Þ
The dependent variable is the growth rate of the industry-to-GDP trend, as
plotted in Figure 10. t is the quarter index. The right-side variables are the
16 Babacan, “İnşaatta Ölçüsüz Rantlar Var.”
17 The trend of the industrial sector is negative for the period before 2003, and hence has been
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components of real GDP (in billions of TL), as measured in 1998 prices
provided by Turkstat. All GDP components are seasonally adjusted.18
If part of the slowdown in the growth rate of the industrial sector is due to
transfers to the construction sector, then we would expect the coefficient
associated with the construction sector to be negative. Specifically, if the rise in
the construction sector in the previous quarter (Constructiont–1) is associated




t Þ, then β2< 0 (for private construction) and/or β3< 0 (for public
construction).
Table 3 shows the regression results. It is observed that an increase in
public construction in the previous quarter reduced the industry-to-GDP
trend in the period before 2006 (row 2, column 1). This finding is consistent
with the claim that the excessive rents generated in the construction sector led
to transfers from the industrial sector to the public construction sector, thereby
slowing down the growth rate in the industrial sector. Turning to the second
column, it is observed that the public construction sector actually supported the
industrial sector in the crisis environment, when the construction sector was
deliberately supported by the government so as to provide such a boost.
Nevertheless, any feedback from the construction sector into the industrial
sector disappears in the last sample, as the share of construction slows, as
shown in Figure 5. This finding suggests that the declining trend in the







1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Source: Turkstat and authors’ calculations.
18 In order to distinguish between public and private construction, we have used the decomposition


























industrial sector observable in the post-crisis era cannot be explained by
transfers to the construction sector, even though the rapid increase in con-
struction during the pre-crisis period had a negative effect on industrial growth.
Acemoğlu and Üçer attribute the slowdown in the period after 2007 to
deterioration in economic and political institutions, as well as to the absence of
structural and economic reforms during this period.19
As for the remaining coefficients, there is negative serial correlation
in the industrial sector during the period before 2006, as shown by the significant
coefficient during that timeframe (column 1). While there is no feedback
from the agricultural sector into the industrial sector for the first two periods, the
service sector contributed positively in the first period and negatively in the
second period.
Table 4 provides a mirror-image exercise similar to Table 3. Here, we have
put under the magnifying glass the trend growth in the share of construction
(as our dependent variable) to see if an acceleration in the growth of the
construction sector is associated with a decline in the industrial sector in the
previous quarter. If the increase in construction’s share is at least partly due to
transfers to this sector from industry, then we should observe a negative
coefficient associated with the industrial sector in the previous quarter. The
first column in Table 4 reflects that this was indeed the case for the first sample
Table 3. Trend Growth in Industry/GDP
1998–2006 2007–2010 2011–2015
1. ConstructionPrivatet1 –0.14 –0.05 0.01
(0.20) (0.03) (0.11)
2. ConstructionPrivatet1 –0.86** 0.17** 0.05
(0.22) (0.07) (0.10)
3. Industryt–1 –0.19** 0.07* 0.04
(0.08) (0.03) (0.06)
4. Agriculturet–1 0.16 0.00 –0.17*
(0.12) (0.05) (0.09)
5. Servicest–1 0.22** –0.08** –0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
6. R2 0.93 0.61 0.91
7. Number of observations 35 16 17
HAC standard errors and covariance are reported under coefficient
estimates in parenthesis. ** indicates significance at 99 percent level of
confidence, * indicates significance at 95 percent level of confidence.
The regression model includes a constant.
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period, thus supporting our findings in Table 3. Also similar to Table 3, this
effect disappears in the next two sub-samples. In other words, the results
suggest that there was indeed a shift from the industrial sector to the con-
struction sector during the period before 2006, when the construction sector
grew quite rapidly. However, this evidence disappears in the post-crisis era,
when construction growth slowed.
The political costs of Turkey’s urban development
Turkey went through a dramatic urban development, particularly in the period
from 2002 to 2006, although this development was achieved through exces-
sively centralized and clientelistic means. While some of the economic costs of
this construction boom declined after 2006, political concerns remained insofar
as the sector continued to be under the influence of the clientelistic relations
between a highly interventionist state and its allies in the private sector, with
little transparency, checks and balances, or deliberation.
A major concern regarding Turkey’s real estate development arises from the
fact that it has significantly increased state influence on the distribution of land
rents.20 Over the past decade, we have witnessed how a strong government
administration—one that enjoys single-party rule, control over the legislative
Table 4. Trend Growth in Construction/GDP
1998–2006 2007–2010 2011–2015
1. Industryt–1 –8.19** 1.58 0.74
(3.79) (2.40) (1.37)
2. Constructiont–1 –18.76 5.72 1.34
(12.54) (3.43) (3.47)
3. Agriculturet–1 5.62 12.86** 4.48**
(5.82) (3.95) (1.90)
4. Servicest–1 8.14** –1.82 –0.53
(1.16) (1.45) (0.62)
6. R2 0.75 0.50 0.60
7. Number of observations 35 16 17
HAC standard errors and covariance are reported under coefficient
estimates in parenthesis. ** indicates significance at 99 percent level of
confidence. The regression model includes a constant.
20 See Erbatur Çavuşoğlu, “İslamcı Neoliberalizmde İnşaat Fetişi ve Mülkiyet Üzerindeki Simgesel Hale,”
Birikim 270 (2011): 40–51; Kuyucu and Ünsal, “Urban Transformation as State-led Property Transfer”;

























branch, and the absence of rival institutions—has used the powers in its
discretion to further consolidate its control. In this context, the changes and
amendments made to property development laws over the past decade have
expanded the administration’s role in the creation21 and distribution of land
rents.22 Under these circumstances, the government can create new land
rents, either by commodifying more public land or by relaxing building permits
for already commodified lands. Weakness in terms of democratic procedures
enables state institutions to avoid consulting citizens during commodification
and other decisions related to the usage of public land. In addition, the
limitations on transparency and on the checks and balances among institutions
create a large space within which the administration can maneuver to influence
the distribution of the land rents generated through these developments.
While land sales are conducted through public tenders, which are regulated
through laws passed in 2002, recent amendments to the law have decreased the
power of regulatory institutions, thus challenging fair competition.23 As a
result, some actors enjoy noncompetitive access to land rents. This, as Ali
Babacan has noted, makes for “excessive rents” (ölçüsüz rantlar) thanks to these
actors’ ability to build inroads to the state bureaucracy and obtain favors.
However, according to the Chamber of Civil Engineers, numerous competent
construction companies remain unable to receive such rents.24 This situation
prevents institutionalization, limits free and fair competition, and decreases
efficiency.
Turkey’s state-controlled property development also has implications for
the process of democratization. Both older and more recent studies on
modernization suggest that economic development contributes to democrati-
zation.25 In this theory lies the assumption that an independent bourgeois class
can play a positive role in democratization.26 Among the many reasons for this,
the most significant is that an independent bourgeoisie can balance political
authority by demanding political representation in return for its economic
21 Çavuşoğlu, “İslamcı Neoliberalizmde İnşaat Fetişi.”.
22 Mehmet Penpecioğlu, “Kapitalist Kentleşme Dinamiklerinin Türkiye’deki Son 10 Yılı: Yapılı Çevre
Üretimi, Devlet ve Büyük Ölçekli Kentsel Projeler,” Birikim 270 (2011): 62–73.
23 Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan, “Politics and Class: The Turkish Business Environment in the
Neoliberal Age,” New Perspectives on Turkey 46 (2012): 27–63.
24 İnşaat Mühendisleri Odası, “Toki Değerlendirme Raporu,” November 13, 2011, http://www.imo.org.tr/
resimler/dosya_ekler/2d6528de98702ba_ek.pdf?tipi=4&turu=H&sube=0.
25 See, for example, Seymour Martin Lipset,Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, NY: Doubleday
& Company, 1963); David Epstein et al., “Democratic Transitions,” American Journal of Political Science
50, no. 3 (2006): 551–569; and Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, “How Development Leads to
Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 2 (2009): 33–48.
26 Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of
























102 Seda Demiralp, Selva Demiralp and İnci Gümüş
contributions through taxation. Nevertheless, this democratizing effect of
economic development may be more limited or even absent in clientelistic
societies where the bourgeoisie is dependent on state favors.27 Members of the
bourgeoisie are then “contingent democrats” who support democracy
only when their economic interests are relatively independent from state
support.28 Therefore, to the extent that property development in Turkey takes
place through noncompetitive and clientelistic means, this constitutes an
obstacle for democratization. In the real estate market—where the careers of
real estate developers largely depend on their ability to secure cheap land,
profitable government contracts, and/or favorable construction permits—they
become dependent on the state thanks to their privileged connections with the
government bureaucracy, which in turn hinders the democratic potential of this
entrepreneurial class. This becomes a particularly important problem when
competitors for government contracts, public land, or exceptional construction
permits include actors who have a particular need to maintain an objective
stance toward the government, such as the owners of media companies. Over
the past decade in Turkey, the majority of media patrons—among them Çalık
Holding, the Kalyon Group, the Albayrak Group, and Çukurova Holding—
have been able to count themselves among the winners of billion-dollar
government contracts in the real estate sector. In the eyes of the public,
this situation has given rise to significant doubts concerning their objectivity.
The combination of political centralization and neoliberalism in Turkey’s
urban renewal policy also erodes ordinary citizens’ “right to the city” in that
decisions on urban development are made largely between the state and private
developers.29 The changes made to the law, described in the previous sections,
centralized urban development and weakened the power of local and elected
actors. As a result, citizen participation in the making of urban policy has
eroded considerably. Under these circumstances, the rent value of land has
come to dominate over its social value, shared public space has declined
dramatically, and high-rise buildings have replaced lower buildings, all of which
has caused major negative externalities to be incurred by citizens—who may in
27 See, for example, Roderic Camp, Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth-Century Mexico
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and
John D. Stephens, eds., Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1992); and Ayşe Buğra, State and Business in Modern Turkey (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1994).
28 Eva Bellin, “Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late- Developing
Countries,” World Politics 52 (2000), 197.
29 See Henry Lefebvre, Writings on Cities, tr. and ed. Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 63; Mark Purcell, “Citizenship and the Right to the Global City:
Reimagining the Capitalist World Order,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 27,

























fact never have asked for such developments in the first place. In the absence of
checks and balances among institutions and with a lack of participatory
decision making, cities transform too rapidly, and the transformation proceeds
according to the interests of the state and its partners in the private sector,
rather than the interests of ordinary citizens.30
In order to overcome the challenges described above, Turkey needs an
urban reform that would promote decentralization and checks and balances
among those institutions responsible for the regulation of property develop-
ment, as well as instituting transparency and citizen participation in urban
planning.31 Such reforms would, firstly, need to limit the excessive powers and
exemptions enjoyed by the HDA, and subject the HDA’s activities to the
supervision of regulating institutions such as the Court of Accounts, adminis-
trative courts, and the PPA. Secondly, the LMM and other municipal laws
need to be reformed in such a way as to decentralize municipal administrations
so as to increase the decision-making power of local municipalities in devel-
oping city plans. Any such reforms should also increase transparency and
deliberation during the making of city plans, and should enable residents to
have access to these decisions both directly and indirectly, through locally
elected city council members. Thirdly, the PPA needs to be reformed, with
exemptions to the PPL being lifted, PPA procedures being tightened so as to
ensure transparency, and restrictions being placed on media patrons’ partici-
pation in public procurements (as was originally suggested in 2002 by Kemal
Derviş, who was serving as the Minister of Economic Affairs during the
drafting of the PPL).
Conclusion
In this article, we have analyzed recent developments in the construction
sector in Turkey and considered their economic and political significance. Our
analysis has shown that, between 2002 and 2006, the construction sector
grew rapidly, supported by state interventions occurring mainly in the form of
legal reforms as well as economic incentives. The growth in private sector
30 See Purcell, “Citizenship and the Right to the Global City”; Richard Van Deusen, “Public Space Design
as Class Warfare: Urban Design, the ‘Right to the City’ and the Production of Clinton Square, Syracuse,
NY,” GeoJournal 58, no. 2/3 (2002): 149–158.
31 Anwar Shah, ed., Participatory Budgeting (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2007); Yves Sintomer,
Carsten Herzberg, Anja Röcke, and Giovanni Allegretti, “Transnational Models of Citizen Participation:
The Case of Participatory Budgeting,” Journal of Public Deliberation 8, no. 2 (2012): 1–34; Allison Brown
and Annali Kristiansen, Urban Policies and the Right to the City: Rights, Responsibilities, and Citizenship
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construction has returned to regular trends in the post-2007 period, although
public sector construction has continued to rise.
One concern in this regard is that the excessive rents that can be generated in
the construction sector provide incentives to leave the industrial sector in favor of
construction. Our findings provide evidence of such transfers occurring for the
period before 2006, although the construction sector does not seem to be
responsible for the declining trend of the industrial sector in the post-crisis period.
The state-led rise of the construction sector has also had important political
consequences, which have remained significant even in the post-crisis period
when growth in the sector has slowed. The central role of the government
administration and opaqueness in terms of the distribution of land rents and
other incentives continue to increase the private sector’s dependence on the
state, to challenge fair competition, and to erode ordinary citizens’ influence on
urban development. These problems need to be addressed urgently through
reforms in urban policy. Any such reforms need to decentralize property
development, to restore checks and balances among the institutions that
regulate the relevant processes, to increase citizens’ access to urban policy
decisions, and to ensure transparency and competitiveness in the distribution
of land rents.
References
Acemoğlu, Daron and Murat Üçer. “The Ups and Downs of Turkish Growth, 2002–2015:
Political Dynamics, the European Union and the Institutional Slide.” NBER Working Paper No:
21608, 2015.
Atiyas, İzak. “Economic Institutions and Institutional Change in Turkey during the Neoliberal Era.” New
Perspectives on Turkey 14 (2012): 45–69.
Babacan, Ali. “İnşaatta Ölçüsüz Rantlar Var.” Yeni Şafak. September 16, 2014. http://www.yenisafak.com.
tr/ekonomi/babacan-insaatta-olcusuz-rant-var-685512.
Bellin, Eva. “Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late- Developing
Countries.” World Politics 52 (2000): 175–205.
Brown, Allison and Annali Kristiansen. Urban Policies and the Right to the City: Rights, Responsibilities, and
Citizenship. UNESCO, UN-HABITAT, March 2009. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0017/001780/
178090e.pdf.
Buğra, Ayşe. State and Business in Modern Turkey. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.
Buğra, Ayşe and Savaşkan. Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth-Century Mexico. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989.
Çavuşoğlu, Erbatur. “İslamcı Neoliberalizmde İnşaat Fetişi ve Mülkiyet Üzerine Simgesel Hale.” Birikim
270 (2011): 40–51.
Epstein, David, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen and Sharyn O’Halloran. “Democratic
Transitions.” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3 (2006): 551–569.
Eğilmez, Mahfi. “İnşaata Dayalı Büyüme Modelinin Sonu.” August 10, 2015. http://www.mahfiegilmez.
com/2015/08/insaat-onderliginde-buyume-modelinin.html.
Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. “How Development Leads to Democracy.” Foreign Affairs 88,
no. 2 (2009): 33–48.


























“İnşaattaki Artış Diğer Sanayileri Engelliyor.” March 26, 2015. http://www.emlakguncel.com/haber/
insaattaki-artis-diger-sanayileri-engelliyor.
Karaman, Ozan. “Urban Neoliberalism with Islamic Characteristics.” Urban Studies 50, no. 16 (2013):
3412–3427.
Kuyucu, Tuna and Özlem Ünsal. “Urban Transformation as State-led Property Transfer: An Analysis of
Two Cases of Urban Renewal in Istanbul.” Urban Studies 47, no. 7 (2010): 1479–1499.
Lefebvre, Henry. Writings on Cities. Translated and edited by Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1963.
Moore, Barrington Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the
Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1993.
Pamuk, Şevket. “2007 Sonrası Partiye Yakın Zengin Bir Zümre Yaratmak En Büyük Ekonomik Hedef
Oldu.” Interview by Ezgi Başaran. Radikal. December 1, 2014. http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/
ezgi_basaran/2007_sonrasi_partiye_yakin_zengin_bir_zumre_yaratmak_en_buyuk_ekonomik_hedef_
oldu-1242057.
Penpecioğlu, Mehmet. “Kapitalist Kentleşme Dinamiklerinin Türkiye’deki Son 10 Yılı: Yapılı Çevre
Üretimi, Devlet ve Büyük Ölçekli Kentsel Projeler.” Birikim 270 (2011): 62–73.
Purcell, Mark. “Citizenship and the Right to the Global City: Reimagining the Capitalist
World Order.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 27, no. 3 (September 2003):
564–590.
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, eds. Capitalist Development
and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
Sintomer, Yves, Carsten Herzberg, Anja Röcke and Giovanni Allegretti. “Transnational Models of Citizen
Participation: The Case of Participatory Budgeting.” Journal of Public Deliberation 8, no. 2 (2012):
1–34.
Shah, Anwar, ed. Participatory Budgeting. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2007.
Törüner, Yaman. “İnşaat Sektörü Krizden Nasıl Etkilenir?” Milliyet. January 29, 2008. http://www.milliyet.
com.tr/insaat-sektoru-krizden-nasil-etkilenir-/yaman-toruner/ekonomi/yazardetayarsiv/29.01.2008/
236508/default.htm.
Van Deusen, Richard. “Public Space Design as Class Warfare: Urban Design, the ‘Right to the City’ and
























106 Seda Demiralp, Selva Demiralp and İnci Gümüş
